http://decision.tcc-cci.gc.ca/tcc-cci/decisions/en/item/71438/index.do 
Kardaras v. The Queen (May 6, 2014 – 2014 TCC 135) was a case involving transferee liability under subsection 325(1) of the
Excise Tax Act (the counterpart of the more well known subsection 160(1) of the Income Tax Act). The property in question had been purchased in 1987 in the name of Mr. Kardaras. In 2004 he transferred title to his wife at a time when he owed GST. Mrs. Kardaras was assessed one half of the equity in the property:
[1] The Appellant was assessed for the amount of $17,363.39 in respect of GST and accrued interest and penalties, pursuant to subsection 325(1) of the
Excise Tax Act (the “Act”), owing by her husband, P, as the result of the transfer of real property from P to her at which time of transfer P had a tax debt of $13.145.64.
[2] The Appellant’s husband, P, took sole title to a property described as 1395 Danforth Road in Toronto, Ontario (the “Property”) on August 7, 1987, purchased for $382,500 which was used as a rental property. On March 22, 2004, P transferred title of the Property to the Appellant alone, at a time when P was indebted to the Minister in the amount of $13,145.64 for GST, penalties and interest outstanding thereon. The GST owing was a result of assessed filings made by P for his sole proprietorship limousine business. The Minister assumed that the fair market value of the Property at the date of transfer to the Appellant was $334,000 and that there was a mortgage on title not exceeding $295,000, so that net value of the Property was $39,000 and there is no dispute as to those amounts. The Minister also assumes that the Appellant already had beneficial title to one-half of the Property so assumed a net amount of $19,500 was transferred to the Appellant without consideration, obviously an amount in excess of the tax indebtedness owing in any event.
Mrs. Kardaras raised three arguments. Her first argument was that the property had been purchased in 1987 through funds from her dowry advanced by her father and was held by her husband in trust for her from that time:
[10] The evidence shows that when initial title to the Property was acquired in 1987 the Deed was registered solely in the name of the Appellant’s husband, P. The Appellant however argues that $130,000 of the initial $382,500 purchase price was represented by a dowry given by her parents to enable the couple to buy the rental Property for her sole benefit to ensure her future security and that this is supported by the evidence showing a transfer of such amount to their lawyers trust account by cheque from the Appellant’s father, as well as the fact that the Appellant’s name was crossed out on the Deed, suggesting her name did not make it on the Deed by mistake. The Appellant also points to the fact that a Schedule to the original Agreement of Purchase and Sale to acquire the Property was in the name of her father, not the husband, for the reason she testified that the initial intention was that the Property be for her benefit. The Appellant also points to a document dated April 1, 2013 executed by the Appellant, her parents and the Appellant’s father acknowledging this fact as well as a second document executed by the husband on the same date purporting to be a declaration that she was the beneficial owner under an express trust from the date of its purchase including at the time of the transfer in March 22, 2004.
Mrs. Kadaras’s father died prior to the date of trial and her mother was not well enough to testify. The court found that the evidence did not support the trust argument:
[15] The difficulty I have with this argument, aside from the fact [Mr. Kadaras’s] corroborating evidence is not convincing, is that there is no evidence whatsoever where the balance of the purchase price came from. The Property was purchased in 1987 for $382,500 and the only evidence is that the Appellant had $130,000 of that purchase price contributed on her behalf. The mortgage of $295,000 assumed to be a liability on the Property was not registered on title until 2 years later, August 17, 1989, so it is clear the Court has no evidence who contributed what to the balance of the initial purchase price. If the husband contributed more, would the argument not be that he would be entitled to a larger share? When a mortgage was finally registered two years later, the evidence is that the husband was the mortgagor and the Appellant the guarantor, so prima facie, that could suggest he made a larger contribution at that point at least. There is simply not sufficient evidence for the Court to make a determination of resulting trust in this matter.
Secondly she argued that the property was subject to a constructive trust since she had made all of the mortgage, insurance and tax payments out of her bank account since 1987. The court also rejected this line of argument:
[29] In the case at hand the Appellant argues that her husband was unjustly enriched because she paid all the bills in relation to the Property. Even if I were to accept such argument, there had been no evidence as to what contribution her husband made to their married life, including living expenses, other assets or in general that would allow me to determine whether any and who of the parties may have been unjustly enriched in the entire married relationship. Moreover, the Appellant and her husband are not divorced and do not appear to even be in an adversarial position before me regarding their entire properties including the marital home they both still live in, and if they were, no doubt they would be arguing all the factors that might affect their respective positions as contemplated by Sarchuk J. in Karavos above. Again as I stated in Pliskow in paragraph 26:
… This demonstrates why this Court cannot be the best forum for such argument, being availed of only part if not a fraction of the evidence that can possibly exist to determine the issue.
Finally, she argued that the advances by her in relation to the property gave rise to indebtedness on the part of her husband which far exceeded the value he transferred to her. The court also rejected this approach:
[30] The Appellant also argued in the alternative that the payments made from her account for such aforesaid mortgage, taxes and insurance charges totalling well over $400,000 should be treated as indebtedness or loans owed by her husband to her as consideration for the transfer. There is no dispute between the parties that loans or indebtedness owing by the transferor to a transferee can be considered consideration paid for a transfer for the purposes of subsection 325(1). However, there is no evidence of any loan between the Appellant and her husband; no evidence of even any discussion at the time suggesting any portion of these payments would be treated in this way as between them. The fact the Appellant’s husband testified he should have contributed but did not, over such a lengthy period of time, without the Appellant having taken any action on the matters suggests the Appellant did not treat these as loans nor considered herself deprived in any way. In any event, the Appellant is not without recourse in the Ontario Courts if she wishes to make such claim as there is no evidence she granted her husband any legal forbearance or waiver of her rights to seek the remedy of constructive trust or any other remedy available to her. In fact nothing stops the Appellant from seeking credit or repayment for any payment by the Appellant pursuant to this assessment in such Courts either.
As a result, the appeal was dismissed.